The relationship between security and citizenship is more complex than media portrayals based on binary oppositions seem to suggest (included/excluded, security/insecurity), or mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR) and security seem to acknowledge. This is particularly the case in the post-imperial and/or postcolonial contexts of global South where the transition of people from subjecthood to citizenship is better understood as a process of in/securing. For, people were secured domestically as they became citizens with access to a regime of rights and duties. People were also secured internationally as citizens of newly independent 'nation-states' who were protected against interventions and/or 'indirect rule' by the (European) International Society, whose practices were often justified on grounds of the former's 'failings' in meeting the so-called 'standards of civilization'. Yet, people were also rendered insecure as they sought to approximate and/or resist the citizen imaginaries of the newly established 'nation-states'. The article illustrates this argument by looking at the case of Turkey in the early Republican era .
Introduction
The relationship between security and citizenship is more complex than media portrayals based on binary oppositions seem to suggest (included/excluded, security/insecurity), or mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR) and security seem to acknowledge (insecurity originates from outside the state boundaries, and states provide security for 'individuals qua citizens'). 1 On the one hand, access to citizenship rights has brought betterment to peoples' lives, regardless of however relative such betterment has proven to be. Throughout the twentieth century, individuals and social groups constituted their agency as they struggled to gain citizenship rights. On the other hand, citizens continued to experience insecurities even after the transition from subjecthood to citizenship.
The relationship between security and citizenship is particularly complicated in the post-imperial 2 and/or postcolonial contexts of global South. 3 In such contexts, the transition of individuals and social groups from subjecthood to citizenship is better understood as a process of in/securing -that is, neither as a moment of security, as official state discourses proclaim, nor as a process of insecuring, as their critics contend. We use the term 'in/securing' to underscore the reflexivity of security, that is, the ways in which our practices produce 'insecurity' as well as 'security' for ourselves and for others. 4 We understand 'security' as 'the condition of being and feeling safe', 5 and 'insecurity' in terms of both specific and/or military threats and non-specific and/or non-military threats. 6 As part of the process of transition from subjecthood to citizenship, people in the global South were secured domestically since they no longer were imperial and/or colonial subjects, but citizens with access to a regime of rights and duties. People were also secured internationally as citizens of newly independent 'nation-states' who were protected against interventions and/or 'indirect rule' by members of the (European) International Society, whose practices were often justified on grounds of the former's 'failings' in meeting the so-called 'standards of civilization'. Yet, people were also rendered insecure as they sought to approximate and/or resist the citizen imaginaries of the newly established 'nation-states'. Those who did not fit the 'model citizen' mould of the new 'nation-states' experienced myriad insecurities. 7 Security guarantees introduced as part of the citizenship regimes of the 'nation-states' usually coexisted with insecurities generated as part of the dynamics of transition processes, or by the institutional and ideational legacies of imperialism and/or colonialism. 8 In offering this argument, we build on a notion of 'postcoloniality' understood 'as a subjectivity of oppositionality to imperializing/colonializing (read: subordinating/ subjectivizing) discourses and practices' and 'not so much subjectivity "after" the colonial experience'. 9 By adopting such a broad notion of 'postcoloniality', we seek to underscore the relevance of the insights of Postcolonial Studies in understanding the insecurities of not only those who were colonized but also others who were caught within the material and non-material structures of colonialism or imperialism.
For, even in those parts of the world that did not experience colonization, inquiring into the 'postcolonial anxieties' of the elite 10 is likely to offer important insights. A case in hand is the so-called 'standards of civilization'. 11 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 'standards of civilization' set by the (European) International Society 12 were utilized by the European great powers in managing their relations with 'non-Europe' (as with the imposition of unequal treaties, indirect rule and/or League of Nations mandate regimes). These 'standards' allowed the European great powers to regulate their relations with 'non-Europeans', usurp raw materials and open up markets for their products and services. 13 The European great powers' practices as such left their mark on not only those who were colonized but also other 'non-Europeans' whose relations with 'Europe' were shaped by these 'standards'. 14 As an illustration, we look at the early Republican period in Turkey . 15 Turkey may come across as a curious choice to illustrate our argument. The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, following a war of national liberation that was fought in resistance to the Sèvres Treaty of 1918, which was designed to carve out the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I. Turkey narrowly escaped dismemberment and, unlike some other post-Ottoman territories, evaded the imposition of the League of Nations mandate. 16 Western-oriented since its founding, 17 Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, and became a European Community associated country in 1963. Finally, yet importantly, Turkey carries its own imperial baggage visa-vis other post-Ottoman peoples. 18 In other words, Turkey does not come across as a 'typical' case to illustrate insecurities in the global South. Yet, as we suggest below, considering the insecurities of Turkey's early Republican elite offers insights into the complex relationship between citizenship and in/security in the global South. 19 Relatively few scholars have thus far drawn upon Postcolonial Studies to study the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Building on Deringil's research on late Ottoman postcolonial anxieties, 20 we suggest that adopting postcolonial lenses provide fresh insight into the practices of Turkey's early Republican leaders who inherited these anxieties. For, while the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 had affirmed Turkey's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the early Republican leaders were nevertheless concerned about the fragility of such recognition against the background of the (European) International Society's ambivalence towards the Ottoman 'difference'. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic body organized around communities of faith (the so-called Millet system). In the absence of a citizenship regime, the European great powers voiced their scepticism about the Ottomans' ability to govern non-Muslim communities in general and Christian peoples in particular. Turkey's early Republican leaders were met with similar expressions of scepticism (see below) in their early encounters with the International Society. Arguably, their quest for a unified body politic and creating a 'nation-state' was as much a product of their ideas and ideals 21 as it was a part of the attempt to meet the 'standards of civilization' of the International Society. 22 Consider, for instance, how Turkey's early Republican leaders framed their efforts directed towards creating a 'nation-state' in 'civilizational' terms. In a speech delivered on the 10th Anniversary of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) described the Republican leadership's goals in the following manner:
We will raise our country to the level of the most developed and most civilized countries. We will make our nation have the means and sources of utmost prosperity. We will raise our national culture above the contemporary civilization. 23 Rather than rejecting the discourse of 'standards of civilization' that temporalized difference and spatialized time (see below), the Republican leaders sought to locate Turkey in this 'civilization'. Yet at the same time, the very 'civilization' they sought to locate Turkey in was represented as a source of insecurity. In a text no less significant than Turkey's national anthem, which was adopted during the war of national liberation, the European great powers are referred to as the 'single-fanged monster you call civilization'. 24 Our point being, given Turkey's early Republican leaders' ambivalence vis-a-vis 'Europe', and the anxieties they shared with the postcolonial, there are potential insights to be gained from adopting postcolonial lenses in studying Turkey's case.
Section titled 'From subjecthood to citizenship: a process of in/securing' introduces our twofold argument. First, we suggest that individuals' transition from subjecthood to citizenship in the post-imperial and/or postcolonial contexts of the global South should be understood less as a moment of security, or as producing mostly insecurity, but a process of in/securing. 25 Second, we suggest that processes of transition from subjecthood to citizenship in such contexts cannot be captured by focusing on the domestic dynamics alone, but should be studied by locating those dynamics in the international context. Here, we refine the 'included' v. 'excluded' binary by offering the category of 'included/ excluded' in reference to those citizens who were insecured by virtue of their late access to some citizenship rights and/or their lack of sense of empowerment in exercising those rights. Section titled 'Rethinking the literature on citizenship in Turkey' locates our argument vis-a-vis the literature on citizenship in Turkey, which offers rich micro-accounts that are yet to be brought together to offer a macro-account on all citizens' experiences of in/security. The following section looks at Turkey's 'included/excluded' citizens' experiences of in/security during the period under consideration. We discuss the governmental efforts directed at territorializing the country and introducing civic education courses in primary and secondary schools. Section titled 'Turkey's "Model Citizens": Searching for "Ontological Security"?' considers the 'ontological insecurity' of Turkey's 'model citizens' who were not excluded from access to citizenship rights, but were nevertheless rendered insecure as they became increasingly less able to live with 'difference'. Here, we focus on the infamous 'Citizen, Speak Turkish!' campaign of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
From subjecthood to citizenship: a process of in/securing
Students of critical theorizing about International Relations and security 26 have challenged the assumptions that states unfailingly provide security to their citizens and that insecurity originates from non-citizens. 27 They have also challenged the presumption that states primarily (if not exclusively) have responsibilities towards their own citizens. 28 Somewhat more recently, such critique has become central to debates in critical theorizing on border security, surveillance and immigrants. 29 The insecurities experienced by citizens have also been examined in the Citizenship Studies literature, which has looked at the exclusionary and discriminatory practices of states, 30 and the Political Geography literature on the 'whereness of citizenship'. 31 There is also the Postcolonial Studies scholarship, which has considered insecurities of the postcolonial. 32 The argument here builds on the insights of these four bodies of literature and focuses on the relationship between security and citizenship in the global South.
The institution of citizenship regimes against the background of decaying empires and/or colonial regimes is rightly viewed as a moment of celebration. However, such processes of transition from subjecthood to citizenship are also riddled with insecurities. This is the case not only for those who are excluded from the citizenship regimes of newly established states but also for those who are not. One such instance of in/securing can be found in the early experiences of the United States, as analysed by Marston: Although citizenship has been a conceptual foundation in the building of the American state, it is a category of status whose historical (and contemporary) access has been mediated through deep-seated prejudices, such as racism and sexism, and moulded by strongly held beliefs about the 'natural' roles of men and 'others'. 33 Among others, women's experiences in different parts of the world has shown that the removal of legal barriers is only a necessary first step -important but not enough in itself so long as other barriers remain and/or are instituted in the transitory process. 34 Indeed, as Secor underscored, over the years:
the discourse and practice of citizenship [has universalised] the particular constellation of dominant positions (such as maleness, bourgeois status, or identification with the titular ethnic or racial group) that is occupied by 'the citizen', defining those identities that are not encompassed within the seemingly neutral category as particularistic and therefore properly excluded from expression within the public sphere. 35 Hence, Sibley maintained that 'apart from examining legal systems and the practices of social control agencies, explanations of exclusion require an account of barriers, prohibitions and constraints on activities, from the point of view of the excluded'. 36 Our analyses need not stop at examining exclusionary practices, cautioned Sibley, but consider all practices of citizenship. This is because, he argued:
[a] study of exclusion … is necessarily concerned with inclusion, with the 'normal' as much as the 'deviant', the 'same' as well as the 'other' and with the credentials required to gain entry to the dominant groups in society. 37 To this end, we offer a threefold categorization: (1) those who are 'excluded' from the citizenship regimes of 'nation-states', (2) those 'model citizens' who are 'included' by agreeing to approximate the citizen imaginary, and (3) those who are 'included/excluded' due to their resistance or late/r access to citizenship rights, or a lack of sense of empowerment in exercising those rights. 38 This threefold categorization allows us to study the multiple ways in which citizens are in/secured as they seek to approximate or resist the citizen imaginary of 'nation-states'.
We further suggest that processes of transition from subjecthood to citizenship in the global South could be better understood when located in their international context. In offering this argument, we build upon Hindess' analysis of citizenship as a 'conspiracy against the rest of the world'. 39 Citizenship is a 'conspiracy', Hindess argued, by virtue of:
bringing together members of particular subpopulations and promoting some of their interests, but also … rendering the larger population governable by dividing it into subpopulations consisting of the citizens of discrete, politically independent and competing states. 40 While this 'conspiracy' has taken the form of an 'international system of population management' 41 in Western Europe and North America, it has unfolded differently in the global South. 42 In the global South, the dynamics of the 'conspiracy' have historically been conditioned by the global disparities in power/knowledge and anxieties generated by the temporalization of difference and spatialization of time. The temporalizing of difference relegated 'peoples and ways of life to the status of anachronisms' by virtue of their differences. 43 The spatializing of time involved representing some parts of the world as belonging to the past. 44 Many in the global South were introduced to citizenship as part of their struggles against Orientalism's 'geographical violence'. 45 During the age of colonialism, the European great powers pointed to the absence of notions and institutions citizenship in some parts of the world as a moral, intellectual and institutional failure and portrayed such 'failures' as evincing their inability to self-govern in a 'civilized' manner. 46 It was based on such apparent 'failings' of some in meeting the 'standards of civilization' that the members of the (European) International Society justified the need for colonial rule in some places, differentiated treatment of peoples under International Law in other places and/or the need for reform in some other places. 47 Following decolonization, those who used to be on the receiving end of such practices sought to build their own 'nation-states' and mould the former subject peoples in their image of 'model citizen'. 48 Of the citizens of the newly established 'nation-states', both those who sought to resist and those who sought to approximate the new citizen imaginary were in/secured -albeit in different ways. Our intention here is not to underplay the significance of the emancipatory dimension of such processes. Nor do we mean to trivialize the ideas and ideals of the intellectuals in the global South. Rather, we underscore the international context in which their agency is constituted. In offering this argument, our aim is to understand the ways in which the policy-makers' practices of citizenship in the global South produce security and insecurity for the citizens as they respond to (and shape) domestic and international dynamics. 49 
Rethinking the literature on citizenship in Turkey
There has now evolved a substantial body of literature on citizenship in Turkey, detailing the predicament of those who were 'excluded' through the population exchange of 1923 (the Mübadele) whereby the Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey left for Greece, and the Muslims from Greece came to Turkey. 50 The discriminatory practices experienced by those who became citizens of the Republic are also examined in rich micro-accounts on the Kurds, 51 the Alevi, 52 and the minorities as defined in the Treaty of Lausanne. 53 In what follows, we present an overview of the literature by grouping existing studies into two accounts: those who consider the citizenship regime of the Republic as a moment of security for all; and those see it as a process of insecuring of some.
In the literature on citizenship in Turkey, those who consider the 1924 Constitution 54 as marking a moment of security base their argument on the following definition of citizenship as found in Article No.88: 'The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish in terms of citizenship'. 55 The 1924 Constitution could indeed be viewed as having laid the foundations of an inclusive citizenship regime by recognizing the 'minority' status of the Greek Orthodox, 56 Jewish and Armenian Orthodox peoples. 57 This first account acknowledges that, in time, there emerged a gap between what the 1924 Constitution laid down on paper and the citizenship practices of the state. 58 Nevertheless, the first account explains away this gap as an effect of the aberrations of some bureaucrats. Put differently, the first account takes the founding texts of the Republic at face value, and views the insecurities experienced by some citizens as exceptions to an otherwise inclusive citizenship regime.
The first account also credits the Republic's citizenship regime for having instituted a notion of citizenship as found in other 'civilized' countries. As such, these authors seem to situate the efforts of the early Republican leaders vis-a-vis the international context. They nevertheless underplay the challenging nature of the international context of this period and the postcolonial anxieties of Turkey's policy-makers. Yet, the domestic discourses of Turkey's Republican elite indicate that such anxieties were not far from their thoughts. For instance, the minutes of the debates on the adoption of the (Swiss) civil code in Turkey (which also meant the secularization of the civil code) include references to the risk of intervention by European great powers on behalf of the minorities unless the civil code was secularized. 59 Our point being that the first account fails to appreciate how the 1924 Constitution helped to secure the citizens of the Republic of Turkey against those members of the (European) International Society who did not hesitate to express their doubts regarding Turkey's capacity to govern its populace in a 'civilized' manner. 60 The second account offers an important corrective by laying bare the ways in which the early Republican citizenship regime was a far cry from being the moment of security it is portrayed to be by the first account. It was a process of insecuring of some, argue these authors, pointing to an exclusionary pattern in the citizenship practices of this era. 61 Such practices included the withholding of women's political rights until 1934, 62 barring non-Turkish speakers from government and private sector jobs for many years, 63 subjecting minority citizens to discriminatory treatment in war-time taxation and conscription 64 and the settling of immigrants and citizens in line with statist security concerns. 65 While providing immensely valuable micro-accounts on the experiences of insecurity by various aspects of Turkey's citizenry, the second account has focused on the domestic struggles and overlooked the international. Consequently, the first account has not considered the multiple ways in which all citizens were secured and insecured vis-a-vis domestic and international threats during this period. In the absence of such a macro-account bringing together these micro-accounts, we do not have a comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship between security and citizenship in Turkey in the early Republican era.
We submit that in Turkey, as in other global South contexts, the transition of individuals and social groups from subjecthood to citizenship is better understood as a process of in/securing. Our argument deviates from the first account that views the transition as marking a moment of security for all. It is also different from the second account that considers the transition as a process of insecuring for some. We suggest that, on the one hand, the new Republic's citizenship imaginary and practices of citizenship secured Turkey's people as citizens of an independent and sovereign 'nation-state'. No longer were they subjects of an Empire; nor did they face the danger of being subjected to the indirect rule or mandate administration by the European great powers due to their failings in meeting the 'standards of civilization'. On the other hand, people were also rendered insecure by the Republic's citizen imaginary. For, only those who choose (and/ or were able) to approximate the citizen imaginary (i.e. the 'included') exercised full citizenship rights. Turkey's 'included/excluded' citizens did not always feel capable or empowered to make use of rights that were available to them on paper. Furthermore, as evinced by the infamous 'Citizen, Speak Turkish!' campaign (see section titled 'Turkey's "Model Citizens": Searching for "Ontological Security"?'), even the 'included' were insecured as they became less able to live with 'difference'.
Turkey's 'Included/Excluded' citizens
The 1923 Mübadele (population exchange) marked the beginning of the process of in/ securing in the new Republic. Those people we referred to as the 'excluded' were exchanged with Greece in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty. 66 The population exchange was designed by the Norwegian diplomat Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and was lauded by the (European) International Society as guaranteeing the protection of minorities towards preventing future conflicts. 67 In 1922, Nansen received the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to the repatriation and asylum search for the refugees fleeing the war in Russia and Asia Minor. Constructing an '"unmixed" Near East' was the central goal of his mission to Greece and Turkey. 68 The point being that the 'excluded' were products of not only the citizenship imaginary of the new 'nation-state' in Turkey but also the minority and conflict regulation practices of the (European) International Society.
Insecurities of those who were subjected to the population exchange of 1923 are well documented in the academic literature as well as popular culture -as with the following poem by Papa Neofitos Ekonomos (1925):
İsmet Pasha and Venizelos came They decided on a bargain When doing this did they ask any man?
We'd not seen the like since the world began They expelled us from Turkey Tears flowed like blood from all our eyes. 69 This and the following sections ('Turkey's "Included/Excluded" citizens' and 'Turkey's "Model Citizens": Searching for "Ontological Security"?') look at the ways in which those who were not excluded from the new Republic's citizenship regime were in/ secured. The next section discusses the 'ontological security' of Turkey's 'model citizens' (the 'included') and the roles they played in the infamous 'Citizen, Speak Turkish!' campaigns. This section is concerned with the predicament of the non-Muslim minorities and others who sought to resist the 'ideal' citizen mould ('included/excluded'). Whereas the Lausanne Treaty recognized the 'minority' status of the former, the latter's claim to minority status and/rights (as with the Kurds) was not recognized. 70 We chose to focus on two governmental practices that touched the lives of large numbers of people: namely, the territorialization of Turkey and the establishment of civic education courses in primary and secondary schools.
Territorializing Turkey
During this era, the practices of territorialization adopted by Turkey's early Republican leaders included the passing of various laws governing who would be allowed to immigrate to Turkey and where the citizens would settle, erasing the remnants and memories of the past inhabitants through settling the immigrants in places vacated by the Armenian and Rum Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire and the changing of place names throughout Anatolia.
Subjecting the citizens to state-directed movement and settlement measures turned out to be one of the most far-reaching aspects of the practices of in/security of this era. During these years, the Ankara governments passed two settlement laws governing who can immigrate to Turkey and become a citizen, and where the new citizens would be allowed to settle. In 1926, the Law on Settlement No. 885 was adopted. 71 This law remained in effect until the more extensive Law on Settlement No. 2510 was codified in 1934. 72 Article No. 2 of the 1926 Law of Settlement addressed the newly arriving immigrants and stated that people who did not belong to the 'Turkish culture' could not be admitted as immigrants or refugees. While Turkish language skills were apparently prioritized in defining the boundaries of the 'Turkish culture', Turkey's Republican leaders nevertheless allowed religious and/or ethnic factors to shape their practices. 73 The Turkish-speaking immigrants were mostly directed to settle in places where they were expected to help with diluting the non-Turkish speaking population. The non-Turkish-speaking immigrants, in turn, were settled in places that would help with their integration. One exception to this practice was the settlement of the Turkish-speaking immigrants in 'securitysensitive' areas (as with Eastern Thrace, on Turkey's border with Greece and Bulgaria).
The Law on Settlement No. 2510 was less about settling newly arriving immigrants as it was about re-settling non-Turkish speaking and non-Muslim citizens of the Republic. Article No. 2 read:
Turkey is divided into three settlement zones: zone 1 are the areas deemed to be where the population of the Turkish culture is dense … zone 2 are the areas separated for the migration and settlement of the population deemed to be assimilated into the Turkish culture … zone 3 are the areas where settlement is prohibited owing to reasons related to health, economy, culture, politics, the military and security. 74 Whereas Turkish language apparently constituted a key component of the 'Turkish culture' as operationalized by the 1926 law, the 1934 law put emphasis on 'lifestyle'. Article No. 10 of the 1934 law targeted the lifestyle of the nomads in general and the Kurds in particular and abolished all of the previously documented and recognized rights of the tribal chiefdoms and sheikhdoms. 75 By way of dividing the country into three zones and re-settling the citizens based on their proximity to the 'Turkish culture', the 1934 law sought, to quote the Grand National Assembly (GNA) lawmakers, to 'create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment'. 76 Accompanying the two settlement laws were practices that sought to territorialize Turkey by allowing the newly settled citizens to convert the material culture in their places of settlement. The literature on the spatial practices of the early Republican period has mostly focused on the ways on which the new Republic sought to shape the body politic through shaping a new architectural culture. 77 However, shaping a unified body of citizens may also involve violence directed against the material culture. The evidence of past coexistence and heterogeneity may be (directly) destroyed or (indirectly) allowed to decay through the targeting of elements of the material culture, as with architectural symbols or the urban fabric of cities. 78 Indeed, Turkey's early Republican leaders chose to settle the immigrants in places vacated by the Armenian and Greek Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire, thereby giving these re-populated places a makeover. In the process, the remnants of the past inhabitants were erased and the memories of those who were left behind were hurt. 79 Another aspect of the practices adopted during this period was the changing of place names. During the war of national liberation, place names were changed mostly for emotive reasons, as with the newly liberated towns wishing to reclaim the space. 80 The changing of place names became a feature of Republican leaders' practices only after the breakup of the Kurdish rebellions in southeastern Anatolia. From the mid-1920s onwards, the practice of renaming was not limited to Greek or Armenian place names but also encompassed those in Arabic and Kurdish as well. 81 To summarize, the desire to create a unified citizen body through managing the flow of immigrants and their areas of settlement was unmistakable during this period. The settlement practices of the state were not isolated to the immigrants but also involved those citizens who had failed, until then, to approximate the new Republic's citizen imaginary. For instance, the 'model citizen' image of the Republic was imposed on the peoples who were brought up in a nomadic lifestyle. Such imposition of a settled lifestyle, while allowing for provisioning peoples in terms of access to health services and education (security), at the same time rendered apparent the limits of recognition of and respect for (linguistic and lifestyle) difference in the new Republic's citizen imaginary (insecurity). 82 
The civic education courses in primary and secondary schools
In Turkey, as in other places, the nation-state '[was] inscripted in official documents, histories and journalistic commentaries, among other texts -in ways that impose coherence on what is instead a series of fragmentary and arbitrary conditions of historical assemblage'. 83 In early Republican Turkey, practices to this effect included the propagation of the so-called Turkish History thesis, 84 the language reform that involved the transition from Arabic to Latin alphabet and ridding Turkish of Arabic and Persian words and the changing of peoples' surnames into Turkish. The most emblematic of them all for our purposes was the introduction of a compulsory civic education course in the primary and secondary schools. Since this course served the purpose of introducing, justifying and cementing all of the other cultural practices, this section of the article will focus on the civic education course. 85 The name of the civic education course was Yurt Bilgisi (Homeland Knowledge). The course textbook 86 was authored by Afet İnan, the historian and adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). 87 While other textbooks were also produced during this period, 88 we will focus on the İnan textbook, for its story as well as content help illustrate the Republican leaders' efforts to mould Turkey's peoples in their image of 'model citizens'.
The 1931 textbook's notion of citizenship was a 'civic republican' one, defining citizenship within the parameters of solidarism and community. 89 Whereas the 'liberal' definition of citizenship casts citizenship as a status involving rights accorded to citizens, the 'civic republican' definition casts it as a practice involving responsibilities to the wider society. 90 As with some other 'nation-states' of the time, Turkey's citizenry was 'regarded as, at best, an eventually educable ward and, at worst, someone prone to derail the national journey with his irrational and provincial proclivities'. 91 Given the course's objective of fashioning 'civilized' and 'modern' citizens, who would be 'obedient' to the Republic, 92 the textbook put more emphasis on the duties and obligations of citizens towards the state, and less on citizens' rights. İnan later explained such de-emphasis on citizens' rights with reference to Mustafa Kemal's thinking that every right should be complemented by a duty. 93 The need to tilt the rights/duties balance towards the latter was formulated previously by the Ottoman intellectual Ziya Gökalp who cautioned:
Do not say 'I have rights';
There is only duty, not right.
A sociologist by training, Gökalp's ideas shaped the thinking of early Republican leaders even after his untimely death in 1924. 94 The Republican People's Party's motto of this era, 'one language, one culture, one ideal', 95 was also inscribed into the students' worldview through the civic education textbook. The text's emphasis on fashioning a unified citizen body of 'one language, one culture, one ideal' translated into a less than accepting attitude towards all those who fell short of approximating the Republic's citizen imaginary. Regarding the non-Turkish speakers, the textbook said:
In the current political and social unity of the Turkish nation, some of our citizens are being encouraged to adopt a Kurdish, Circassian, Laz or Bosnian identity, but these misnomers, which are remnants of an autocratic period from the past, have caused nothing but misery among these individuals, with the exception of a backward and brainless few. For these members of the nation also share the same common past, history, ethics and law. 96 To recapitulate, in the early Republican period, peoples of myriad origins could choose to be 'included'. The ticket of entry was exhibiting willingness to approximate the Republic's citizen imaginary as detailed in the civic education textbook. Such willingness was to be exhibited through not drawing attention to (if not forgetting) one's ethnic/religious/sectarian difference/s. 97 The narrative of the civic education textbook rendered 'backward' all those who failed or refused to approximate the citizen imaginary.
Thus, while the textbook constituted an instance of the Republican leadership's stratagem for securing Turkey vis-a-vis the (European) International Society through creating a unified body of citizens, at the same time, it rendered myriad peoples insecure by narrowing the bounds of recognition of and respect for difference.
Turkey's 'Model Citizens': searching for 'Ontological Security'? 98 'Ontological security' refers to an individual's identity and his or her ability to maintain who he or she is when faced with challenges. 99 It may come across as counterintuitive to consider Turkey's 'model citizens' as anything other than secure. Yet, their rigid responses to public expressions of 'difference' by their fellow citizens could be viewed as an instance of their search for 'ontological security' in the face of the latter's avowal of their difference/s. This is partly because Turkey's 'included' citizens' sense of self was a product of a citizen imaginary that was not accepting of public expressions of 'difference'. Another, and perhaps more important, part of the reason was to do with the way in which Turkey's 'model citizens' could become 'included', that is, through learning not to draw attention to (if not to forget) their own difference/s. Arguably, Turkey's 'included' citizens viewed others' expressions of their difference/s as a challenge to their own sense of self. Such expressions of 'difference' included using languages other than Turkish in public places, which sparked the infamous 'Citizen, Speak Turkish!' campaigns of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The 'Citizen, speak Turkish!' campaigns were directed against the minority citizens and were organized and ran by non-governmental actors such as the Turkish Hearths Association and the Students' Association of the Faculty of Law. 100 Some citizens actively participated in the 'Citizen, Speak Turkish!' campaigns while some others were complicit in their silence. 101 The first step in the campaign was taken by the Students' Association of the Faculty of Law in İstanbul. On 13 January 1928, the Students' Association of the Faculty of Law in İstanbul organized a campaign aimed at discouraging the use of languages other than Turkish in public places. 102 The students put up signs that read, 'We cannot say Turk to people who do not speak Turkish'. 103 They also resorted to accosting people speaking foreign languages in public places. Those who did not speak Turkish were labelled as 'fake citizens' of the Republic. 104 The Turkish Hearths Association organized similar campaigns in some other parts of the country. 105 While many Kurds at the time were non-Turkish speakers, the fact that 'Citizen, speak Turkish!' campaigns were organized in cities and towns populated by minority citizens suggested that the latter were the real targets of this campaign.
The campaigns led to tension and conflict, as the participants did not only suggest that everyone in Turkey should speak Turkish but they also threatened some non-Turkish speakers in an attempt to make them speak Turkish. Some of the activists instigated court cases against some non-Turkish speakers, citing Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code about 'insulting Turkishness'. 106 Others called on their fellow citizens to '[e]ither speak Turkish or leave the country'.
While the 'Citizen, speak Turkish!' campaigns were entirely in line with what the Republican leaders encouraged under the slogan 'one language, one culture, one ideal', the forceful approaches of the youth was eventually met by Ankara's disapproval. As the campaigners began to resort to more and more violent methods, the government intervened and called for a halt. 107 To recapitulate, Turkey's 'included' citizens are peoples of myriad origins who learned not to draw attention to their difference/s as they were moulded into 'model citizens' of the Republic. As products of the citizen imaginary of the Republic, they, too, were in/ secured as they became increasingly less able to live with 'difference'.
Conclusion
In Turkey's early Republican practices, we observe both faces of citizenship as a 'conspiracy against the rest of the world' (section 'From subjecthood to citizenship: a process of in/securing'). First, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, whereby Turkey and Greece agreed to exchange populations, was a product of citizenship practices as an 'international system of population management'. As highlighted in section 'Rethinking the literature on citizenship in Turkey', the population exchange between Greece and Turkey was, in essence, a state-directed movement of ethnic groups, which was endorsed by the (European) International Society as a breakthrough attempt at conflict regulation. 108 Treaties ending the wars of this era invariably included clauses governing population exchanges. Groups that were considered to be (potentially) disloyal were relocated from one part of the state to another or were expelled from the state altogether. 109 Those who were not forced to immigrate fled soon after. 110 Turkey's 'excluded' were insecured as part of this first aspect of citizenship as a 'conspiracy against the rest of the world'.
The second aspect, which is more characteristic of the global South, refers to the postcolonial anxieties of Turkey's early Republican leaders and the choice they made for constructing a unified and cohesive body of citizens. Although Turkey was not colonized, the trauma that was caused by the Ottoman Empire coming to the brink of being dismembered by the European great powers conditioned the thinking of the early Republican leaders. Perhaps more significantly, the experiences and remembrances of late Ottoman Empire and its relations with the (European) International Society shaped their postcolonial anxieties. 111 Going beyond binary portrayals in everyday debates (included/excluded, security/ insecurity) and mainstream IR assumptions on the relationship between security and citizenship (that states provide security to their citizens and that insecurities originate from outside the state boundaries) allows us to consider the in/securing of myriad citizens. Studying the transition of people from subjecthood to citizenship in the global South as a process of in/securing challenges both the mainstream accounts that see the transition as a moment of security, but also some critical accounts that reduce it to a process of insecuring. Inquiring into the relationship between security and citizenship in global South contexts demands particular attention to 'the international' as well as reflexivity of security. To be a member of Westphalian civilization, a non-Western country had to become a State that (1) guaranteed basic rights, as understood in the West, for foreign nationals; (2) had an organized political bureaucracy with the capacity to run governmental functions and organize the country for self-defense; (3) had a Western-style domestic system of law, with courts and written codes of law, that administered justice fairly within its territory; (4) had diplomatic resources and institutions to allow the State to engage in international relations; (5) abided by international law; and (6) 
